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The sales tax merry-go-round slowed briefly on June 23, 1975 to spin
off the Government's Green Paper, entitled Discussion Paper—Federal Sales
and Excise Taxation . Canada's earliest experiment with a sales tax, a turnover
or cascade tax on the German pattern, in 1920 produced such strenuous
opposition that it was replaced by the present manufacturers sales tax as of
January 1, 192U—nearly 52 years ago. The levy was a pioneer for this type
of sales tax—there were no others in existence. While this form was clearly
preferable to the intolerable turnover tax, it was not a popular levy and
might well have been phased out if its life had not been saved by the great
depression of the Thirties. It was tolerated as a necessary evil over the
depression and war years, but in the late Forties, complaints were heard again.
In 1951 the Canadian Tax Foundation, then only five years old, published the
volume I had prepared for it, The General Manufacturers Sales Tax in Canada .
The tax was discussed in the annual Conferences of the Foundation over the
next four years, and the Foundation, in February of 1955, submitted to the
Minister of Finance a memorandum suggesting the need for reconsideration of
the structure and operation of the tax with respect to the definition of
taxable price and the machinery and building materials exemptions, which had
emerged as the most troublesome aspects. As a consequence of this submission
and representation of other groups, the government established a Sales Tax
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Committee, headed by Kenneth Carter, to investigate various aspects of the
tax and make recommendations for change. During the work of the Committee,
the 1955 Tax Foundation Conference again saw substantial discussion of the
issues. The very brief and cryptic report, entitled Report of the Sales
«
Tax Committee, was issued in January 1956, and served as the basis for discus-
2
sion at the Tax Foundation ' s 1956 Conference in Montreal.
In addition to specific recommendations relating to taxable price,
appeals from the Minister's decisions, and other matters, the Report somewhat
unexpectedly stated "At some future date after suitable preparation and
explanation to taxpayers, the basis of the tax be changed from the manufac-
turers* level to the level at which retailers purchase goods."
—
p.l6. Only a
brief explanation of the merits of the change was given, but further elaboration
was provided by Mr. Carter at the 1956 Foundation Conference. The reaction
to the proposal was rather negative, centering around the feeling that
the change would not accomplish much and that it might lead to new discrimina-
tion against various systems of. distribution channels and complicate adminis-
tration. As a consequence, the Minister of Finance announced in the 1957
budget message that this change would not be implemented (nor were the other
changes proposed in the Committee report). The arguments were basically the
same as those currently employed.
Interest in the sales tax and in reform lessened somewhat for the next
several years, but the question was discussed on a less frequent, roughly
Proceedings, op. cit. , 1955 > pp. 231-290.
o
' Proceedings » op. cit. , 1956, pp. 139-166.
3
J.F. Due, "Report of the Sales Tax Committee—One Year in Retrospect,"
Canadian Tax Journal , Vol. 5 (March-Apri1, 1957)> pp. 88-105-

biennial basis at the Tax Foundation conferences. The tax continued to
operate in much the same fashion, with some improvements in operation as
personnel in National Revenue changed. There was a flurry of interest in a
value added tax on several occasions, but not necessarily as a replacement
for the manufacturers sales tax.
2
Next came the Royal Commission report. The first half of Vol. V was
devoted to the sales tax question, an issue on which the Commission had received
a number of submissions. While this section is brief compared to the lengthy
volumes on the income tax, it presents a well reasoned analysis of the issues
and the relative merits of the different forms. The defects in the present
tax we're noted, and a much more drastic reform was proposed than that of
the Carter Committee: "We recommend that the federal government should
3
replace the manufacturer' 9 sales tax with a tax at the retail level;..."
The report also recommended that the Federal Government negotiate with the
provinces to induce them to establish the same tax base and to collect the
k
Federal sales tax along with their own sales taxes.
The report was reviewed at the April 1967 Conference of the Canadian
Tax Foundation, and a variety of objections were raised, particularly by
retailers. Because the government concentrated first on income tax reform,
"Industry Discounts and Appeals Procedures," Proceedings , op. cit. ,
1958, pp." 105-139; "Federal Sales Tax," Proceedings , op. cit. , i960, pp. 182-197;
"ABCs of the Federal Sales Tax," Proceedings , op. cit. , 1962, pp. 1+9-69;
"Sales Taxes in Europe and Canada," Proceedings , op. cit. , 1962, pp. 21+3-273.
." 2
Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1966),
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the sales tax recommendations were thenceforth largely ignored—except on
the part of the provincial governments. Seeing themselves blamed for a sudden
jump of sales taxes from $%-&% to 13#-l6#, they reacted adversely to the proposal,
even though It would have increased their relative importance in the tax ad-
ministration field. They also disliked possible loss of autonomy in the
establishment of the tax base.
Not until June-, 1975 did the Government, in the Green Paper, bring
forth its provisional policy—namely, to move the tax from the manufacturing .'
level to the wholesale level—the same proposal as the Carter Committee of
18 years before. The paper summarizes the defects of the present tax—much
as they were when first presented twenty-five years ago, the tax not having
improved with age (although the administration has) and not having been basical-
ly changed (except in exemptions). If anything, because of increased complexity
in distribution channels, the problems have become worse rather than less
1
serious. The paper rejects the retail sales tax; although recognizing its
theoretical superiority, the paper concludes that "the marginal improvement in
neutrality offered by a retail sales tax over a wholesale sales tax does not
at this time warrant the additional taxpayers and problems (implicit in the
concurrent occupancy of a single tax field by more than one level of government)
involved."
—
p.27» It would appear that the Federal Government has rejected
the retail tax because of the adverse provincial reactions and the problems
that would be involved in attempting to get coordinated operation. The
wholesale tax is selected over the manufacturers tax in the belief that, being
nearer to the retail level, it would be more nearly neutral and minimize the
need for notional prices; in most instances, tax could be applied to the
Statement based upon observations of staff members of National Revenue .

actual price. The issues involved were discussed intensively in the midfifties, and
have "been discussed in other countries, and only a brief summary is necessary:
The Inherent Superiority of the Retail Tax
A sales tax is presumably designed to distribute the burdens arising
from governmental activities in relation to consumer spending—under the
assumption of complete forward shifting of the tax—rather than income.
For this to occur in a fashion consistent with other objectives of government,
certain requirements must be met:
1. Neutrality—avoidance of economic distortion;
a. Of consumer choices among various types of goods and
services, and between imported and domestic goods.
b. Of choices by business firms among various methods of organi-
zation of production and distribution.
Failure to attain neutrality will cause loss of economic efficiency.
2. Equity
—
a.. Avoidance of discrimination among various business firms.
b. Attainment of the desired distribution of tax burden, on a
horizontal basis {equal treatment of equals) and a vertical
basis (avoidance of regressivity ) , and attainment of the desired
degree of progression. .
3. Administration and compliance—minimization of compliance nuisance
and costs, uncertainty, and administrative costs consistent with
effective collection.
The neutrality objectives can be attained fully only if the tax applies
to the final retail selling price, under either a retail sales tax or a
value added tax extending through the retail stage. Only with th$s form of

tax is the tax "burden (assuming exact shifting) uniform on consumer expenditures
on all taxed goods, and is the tax completely neutral among various systems
of distribution. By the same token, only a retail tax is nondiscriminatory
among the owners of various types of business firms and among consumers of
various products. While a retail tax involves more taxpaying firms than the
other forms, it is basically a simpler tax to operate because it can be
applied in virtually all cases to the final selling price without adjust-
ments. For the compliance and administrative requirements to be met fully,
it is imperative that there be operation of the tax by only one level of
government.
There are other requirements, of course, apart from the level at which
the tax is imposed, for an optimal sales tax. These will be noted in sub-
sequent sections.
These advantages of the retail tax were fully recognized by the Royal
Coianission report and at least in part by the Green paper. Yet, as noted,
the proposal was rejected by the Government.
The Inherent Limitations of the Manufacturers and Wholesale Sales Taxes
By contrast, any tax imposed prior to the retail level encounters
several basic defects, which are by now well known:
1. Distribution channels are extremely diverse—in Canada, more than
many countries. As a consequence, when a tax is levied at any pre-retail stage,
it will apply to prices that include costs of more production and distribution
activity for some firms in an industry than for others, and more for some
products than others. In general, any taxpaying firm that undertakes relative-
ly more distribution functions than competing firms is discriminated against.
Products of industries in which a disproportionate amount of the other overall
production and distribution activity is undertaken prior to the impact of the

tax > are subject to relatively more tax per dollar of final consumer expenditure
than other products. The result is to distort consumption patterns and resource
allocation and discriminate against consumers with relatively strong preferences
for the highly taxed goods.
2. The inevitable consequence of the effects noted in 1. is to encourage
firms to push activities (storage, advertising, packaging, warranty, transport)
forward ahead of the point of impact of the tax—something they cannot do
with a retail tax (except to a minor extent, by encouraging consumers to per-
form do-it-yourself activities to get the product into final shape for use).
The result is distortion of organization of production and distribution and
loss of efficiency.
3. In attempting to counteract the worst sources of discrimination
and distortions of the types noted, governments (including Canada) seek
to make adjustments to equalize tax among different distribution systems.
But this not only results in major complications and uncertainty (with such hor-
rors as the old circulars no one could understand and that leprechaun-like
amorphous monster, the unlicensed wholesale branch), but fails to ensure
complete neutrality and equality—no feasible adjustments could eliminate all
inequity. The implementation appears to have improved in the last decade
—
but the problems remain.
h. Because distributors' margins differ widely on various goods—from
15$ to 50% at least'—the tax as a percentage of consumer expenditures varies
widely among different goods, in a fashion entirely haphazard from the
standpoint of policy—under the assumption of exact shifting. In fact,
since. necessities tend to have lower margins than luxuries, the effect is a
perverse one in terms of usual distributional goals.
5. Complete uniformity of treatment of imported and domestic goods
is impossible, with the danger that the tax on domestic goods will be greater
than that on imported goods— simply because more distribution functions are

3performed, in many instances, prior to the point of impact of the tax with
domestic goods.
6. There is less assurance of shifting the exact amount of the tax
to the consumer. With the retail tax, the levy is on the final selling price;
with the pre-retail taxes, the tax is applied earlier, and there are possibili-
ties that the subsequent price increase may not equal the amount of tax.
Percentage markup techniques may result in increases to consumers in excess
of the amount of the tax (pyramiding), and competitive relations and pricing
methods are such in retailing that this excess may continue for long periods.
7* Pre-retail taxes encounter complications in the treatment of freight.
Inclusion only of in-freight within the base of the tax encourages manufacturers
and wholesale distributors to locate close to their sources of supply. In-
clusion of out-freight with a manufacturers tax encourages wholesalers to
locate close to manufacturers and with both forms encounters administrative
problems when purchasers pick up goods with their own trucks, or sellers
distribute goods in their own trucks.
8. Pre-retail taxes cannot be integrated with the provincial retail sales
taxes, resulting in unnecessary duplication in compliance, collection, and
audit.
9. Changes in tax rates encounter problems with regard to inventories
of tax-paid goods. Adjustment of tax on tax-paid inventories is complicated;
failure to adjust is discriminatory and distorts purchasing patterns when
tax changes are anticipated.
10. If, as a matter of policy, it is considered desirable to include
services within the scope of the tax, these cannot be included within the base
of pre-retail levies, since the rendering of services is essentially a retail
type of activity, for which pre-retail taxes are not geared.

qThe Wholesale Sales Tax vs. the Manufacturers Tax
While "both manufacturers and wholesale taxes suffer from these common
defects, the manufacturers tax is somewhat worse, as stressed in the Green
Paper, simply because it is levied at a point farther removed from the final
sales to the consumer, on all transactions passing through wholesale distribu-
tors of any type. Thus with the type of distribution system in which some
manufacturers sell to wholesalers while others sell directly to retailers,
the retail purchase price being the same in the two instances, the wholesale
tax eliminates the discrimination and the need for adjustments, unlicensed
wbAesale branches, and consequent complications that arise with the manu-
facturers tax. The Green Paper estimates that 85 to 90 percent of all transac-
tions could be taxed on the actual selling price. Similarly, since most im-
porting is done at the wholesale level with subsequent sale to retailers,
equality of treatment of domestic and imported goods is easier to attain.
There is somewhat less opportunity for pyramiding, and to the extent that
wholesale margins differ among commodities, the inequality of ratio of tax
to consumer expenditures is reduced. The problem with the present tax, that
no downward adjustment of taxable price is allowed in industries in which there
are no sales to retailers, thus discriminating against consumers of these
products, would be eliminated.
But these advantages are, in my estimation, not nearly as great as the
Green Paper concludes:
1. Nonneutrality among distribution channels
—
Distribution channels are
much more complex, certainly in Canada, than the example given above suggests
—
a fact that was brought out in detail in the discussion of the 1956 Carter
Committee report. The basic problem is backward integration of retailers—of
the assumption of wholesale and even manufacturing functions by large retail
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firms. Accordingly, these firms, as is veil known, buy much more cheaply
from manufacurers than do their smaller competitors. The private brand
situation is the extreme case of this, backward integration, but it occurs
frequently in less spectacular fashion. To seek to make adjustments in 3uch
cases by some form of uplift, as long used under the British purchase tax, is
not only very complex but encounters strong resistance. Downward adjustments
in price for tax purposes encounter far less resistance than upward adjustments
even though, the net result may be the same. The inherent source of the difficul-
ty is that it is impossible to distinguish between price concessions obtained
by large retailers that reflect true economies arising out of large quantity
purchasing from those arising because the retailers have undertaken wholesale
distribution and manufacturing functions, or arising because their bargaining
power is so strong in dealing with small processors. Thus the incentive to
move functions around remains; there is still incentive for firms to transfer
various functions forward of the impact of the tax. This may be less common
than transferring functions forward from the manufacturer, but the cases may
result in severe discrimination and complaint.
2. Imports - While the import problem is less troublesome, there remain
the question of equality of treatment of imports by retailers, particularly
the larger ones.
3. Nonuniformity' of tax to consumer expenditures and uneven shifting
and pyramiding—The wholesale tax may be somewhat less objectionable, but
the difference is not great—simply because retail margins are much greater
than wholesale margins. Most of the source of nonuniformity and the potential
pyramiding occurs at the retail level. Since a majority of all transactions
already go directly from manufacturers to retailers (only 30% of manufacturers'
!
sales are made to wholesalers, according to the Green Paper), the gain from
use of the wholesale tax cannot be great.
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k. Transport cost
—
The wholesale tax does not solve the freight element
problem. The present tax, which excludes out-freight but taxes in-freight,
encourages manufacturers to locate closer to the sources of supply than they
otherwise would. Any attempt to tax out-freight would cause wholesalers to
locate near their sources of supply. With a wholesale tax, it would be
more feasible to include out-freight from wholesaler to to retailer in the tax,
.
as retailers are less mobile, but this is difficult to do in the common
situations in which goods are picked up by retailers in their own trucks
and/or delivered by the manufacturer's truck , and there is no transport
charge, per se. The taxing of out- freight to the retailer would certainly
be opposed by areas of Canada most distant from the sources of supply.
Thus, in summary, the gains from shifting forward to the wholesale level
appear to be rather limited. In addition, problems would be more serious
with regard to dual wholesale-retail businesses. The 50$ rule suggested in
the Green Paper is workable but by no means entirely equitable.
Thus the changes proposed in the Green Paper may represent a net im-
provement, but are certain to generate political opposition and not solve
the basic problems of any pre-retail salss tax. Charge from manufacturing to
wholesale levels is a marginal/change i shift to the retail level is not
marginal, as the Green Paper claims. How feasible is it to move to the retail
level (or a value added tax extending through the retail level) and thus solve
the problems once and for all?
Feasibility of Use of the Retail Level
The common objection against the retail level of the large number of
retail firms (an estimated 250,000 in Canada) is not a significant argument,
since 95% or so of the retailers are already subject to a provincial sales
tax. Effective integration of Federal and provincial taxes, with single
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audit and collection, would simplify overall sales tax administration in
Canada. The Federal Government cannot be considered in a vacuum in this regard.
The basic problem is not the number of taxpayers, but the Federal-pro-
vincial relationships involved and the provincial fears of being blamed for
the high rates. The ideal system would involve joint collection and audit
of the two taxes (as is done with state and local sales taxes in a number of
states in the United States). Administration could be Federal or provincial.
Federal operation would encounter strong provincial opposition, I am sure
and would represent one more step toward weakening the autonomy of the provinces
in financial matters (although they could still use different tax rates).
Provincial operation of the two taxes, as recommended by the Royal Commission,
would not only utilize the well developed provincial administrative systems, but
would also strengthen the relative role of the provinces. But there are two
problems. The first would be the necessity of uniformity of base (or slight
deviation at best); at present, there are some deviations among the provinces
and between Federal and provincial, and the attainment of an agreement on
uniformity would be difficult to say the least. But the major obstacle is a
political one—the probable intense fear of the provinces that they would be
blamed for 13$ to 16% retail sales taxes. Coupled with this would be the
fear of consumers that prices net of tax would not fall by the amount of the
tax removed at the manufacturing level—a fear that suggests that the best
time to make the change is while price controls are in effect.
Separate administration of provincial and Federal retail sales taxes
without uniformity of base would be both a nuisance to the retailer and a source
of unnecessary administrative expense. Yet it is not intolerable; the coverage
of the two sets of taxes would inevitably be much the same, and vendors would
use a joint schedule of total provincial and Federal tax to collect on each
transaction. A similar system is used in several states in the United States,
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where the state and the local governments apply and administer their own sales
taxes, vendors filing two separate returns. This is not recommended,
obviously, hut it is not unworkable. But the political fears at both
Federal and provincial levels of public reaction to sales tax rates as high
as 16% would remain.
How strong would consumer resistance to a 16% retail sales tax be? This
is impossible to assess. Norway used a 20$ sales tax for some years, but
<cept it hidden. The United States used several 20% nonconcealed retail
excise taxes during the World War II period, and these did not seem to produce
intolerable reactions. The 8% rates in Quebec and other provinces are the highest
general rates that have been used in Canada. If a strong publicity campaign were
undertaken to convince the public that they were not actually paying more taxes--that
the higher retail tax was offset by an equivalent decline in cost of the goods
net of tax—it might be possible to make the transition without serious
complaint. In a sense, a period of price controls is the ideal time to make
the change. But politicians may feel otherwise.
A Hidden Sales Tax?
One possible solution to this problem would be to make both the taxes
"hidden taxes"—merge the Federal and provincial levies and eliminate the
requirement for separate quotation and collection of tax. There has long
existed the belief in Canada—on the part of people who should know better
—
that if the provisions of the provincial laws relating to separate collection
1
were eliminated, retailers would adjust prices to conceal the tax. This
J.F. Due* "The Indirect Sales Tax Illusion," Canadian Tax Foundation
Tax Memo No. 23, Sept., i960.

V-i
is almost certain not to happen; retailers typically much prefer to keep
the tax separate—to avoid the onus of higher prices, to simplify their
accounting, to avoid interference with traditional price lines, to avoid
the need to change prices when the tax rate changes, and because of their
belief
—
probably valid—that full shifting of the tax is easier vith the
separate quotation rule. Actual hiding of the tax could be attained only
with a mandatory requirement for concealing the tax, as some countries have
done. Not only would the retail groups almost certainly fight this, but
other groups would as well; the pricipal criticism made against the Green
Paper in the Globe and Mail this summer was over the failure of the pro-
posed changes to end the hidden nature of the Federal sales tax. There
are very good reasons for not requiring that the tax be hidden, quite apart
from typical retailer opposition. There is much greater likelihood of
exact shifting with separate quotation. More fundamentally, there is great
merit in a democracy of keeping the taxpayers aware of the taxes they are
paying—to permit more rational action on overall levels of governmental
expenditures and revenues. The old German attitude that unmerklichkeit—
concealment—of a tax is a strong advantage because the public does not
know that they are paying, is not acceptable in a democratic society.
In addition, currently, concealment of the tax is particularly objectionable
in view of the objective of checking price increases.
Reform of the Existing Sales Tax
Given the obstacles to the desired changes, can significant improve-
ments be made in the present manufacturers sales tax? Some improvements
in taxpaying information and audit have been made over the years; my general
impression is that the tax operates with a high degree of administrative
effectiveness and a very thorough audit program. Nearly half of all accounts
Toronto Globe and Mail, July Ik, July 17, and August 13, 1975-
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are audited annually, and virtually all accounts within a four year time
period. Few other governments do equally well. But there are still criticisms
about various aspects, particularly the lack of a statutory basis for the
adjustment of prices to attain uniformity among firms and. the lack of the
right of taxpayer appeal. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine
these issues in detail. While undoubtedly some further improvements can be
made s the problems discussed above are inherent in the tax; no levy imposed
prior to the retail level can avoid discrimination and incentives to shift
functions, operational complications arising out of adjustments, and non-
uniformity of final burden.
Scope of the Federal Sales Tax
Another issue is that of the optimal scope of the Federal sales tax.
Time permits only a brief summary:
!• Producers goods—As noted, a sales tax, to attain the usually accepted
objectives of government, should apply only to sales for final consumption use.
Taxation of sales for business use results in multiple taxation of final
sales, makes investment artificially expensive, distorts the selection of
production methods, and encourages fin s to produce goods for their own use.
Perhaps most seriously, taxation of producers goods places Canadian manufacturers
at a disadvantage in competing with those of other countries. Most industrial
countries and many others have turned to value added taxes of such nature
that all accumulated tax—not only on materials and parts, but on all goods
used in production—is rebated at export. Many industrial states of the
United States free most business purchases from tax. The Canadian firms are
therefore at some disadvantage, one net effect being to reduce the value of
the Canadian dollar below what it would otherwise be. The Canadian Federal
Government has never fully accepted the principle of taxing only sales for
personal consumption so far as is possible, although it exempts most major
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"business purchases. The provinces have even less fully accepted the- principle.
Ontario has shifted position several times, the government never fully-
realizing the danger to its industries of taxing industrial machinery
and other major producers goods. The one great merit of use of the value
added tax over other forms of sales tax is that it appears to encourage
governments to exclude all producers goods —although its technical ad-
vantages in doing so over other forms of sales tax are probably not substan-
2
tial. The provinces particularly must recognize the need for adjusting
their retail sales taxes to reduce the tax on inputs of manufacturers.
2. Commodity exemptions—For the requirements of neutrality, horizontal
equity, and administrative simplicity to be met fully, a sales tax must
apply to all consumption expenditures, on commodities and services, without
exemptions. But this requirement is usually considered to conflict with the
requirement for vertical equity, that the tax not be regressive and not place
a significant absolute burden on the lowest income groups. The ideal solu-
tion for the problem would be complete sales tax coverage and a universal
negative income tax system that would insure a minimum income for all families.
But in the absence of such a system, a compromise is necessary between ver-
tical equity and the other requirements. A second best approach is to provide
a credit against income tax, with cash refunds to persons owing no income
tax, representing sales tax paid on necessary minimum expenditures, as used
in some states; but this approach seems to have less political appeal than
exemptions. It is imperative that exemptions be limited to clearly definable
R.D. Brown, "A Federal Value Added Tax—A Canadian Viewpoint," Proceedings
of the National Tax Association for 1973 , pp. 8^95.
«ote the discussion of this issue in R.A. Musgrave, ed. , Broad Based Taxes
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), pp. 155-226.
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categories of major importance in the budgets of the low income groups.
Food exemption, inevitable in part under manufacturers sales tax
Because
^
much food does not pass through a manufacturing process, may be
warranted
on this basis, though it unnecessarily frees numerous expenditures
of
middle and upper income groups, favors persons with luxurious food
tastes,
and creates compliance and administrative complications.
Prescription drugs
and some other medicines constitute the second category- But unfortunately
governments in Canada, unlike most of their counterparts in other countries,
have not stopped at this point. Clothing is exempted from some of the sales
taxes—but studies show that clothing purchases are progressive by income
group.
1
The trend in the provinces has been to add more and more exemptions
of minor items (such as soap), nibbling away at revenue, creating operational
problems, and accomplishing nothing but trouble.
3- Services—-Purchases of services constitute consumption expenditures
just as do purchase of goods. But North American sales taxes have typically
concentrated on commodities; a manufacturers sales tax almost of necessity does,
But if the Federal tax were to be moved to the retail level, should services
be included? Theoretically, yes. But the problem is that many major serivce
categories are of such nature that society is reluctant to tax them—medical,
dental, hospital, legal, educational. Another group of services is rendered
primarily to business firms and should not be taxed just as other business
purchases should not be taxed (except by a value added tax under which the
firms can credit tax paid on these services against tax liability on their
sales). Other services cannot be reached for administrative reasons-
personal service in the home, or foreign travel, for example; taxation of
housing services creates serious problems of discrimination against tenants
compared to homeowners. This leaves only a group of services rendered by
commercial establishments—laundry, dry cleaning, barber shop, beauty parlor,
^J.M. Schaefer, "Clothing Exemption and Sales Tax Regressivity," American
Economic Review , Vol. 59 (Sept. 1969), pp. 596-599*
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and the like. There is some justification for taxing this group. But
unfortunately the revenue yield is not great, and taxation of them does not
appear to make the tax more progressive. The basic situation with services
is that while taxation of all services ould greatly increase the base of
the tax and improve the distributional pattern, making the tax less regressive,
most of the major services either cannot be reached or are not regarded
as suitable— so what is left will not add more than 10$ to revenue and
'will not improve patterns of distribution. But there is no reason not to
include them—and this can be done only at the retail level (or by a special
tax).
Sales Tax Experience Elsewhere
In the last two decades the patterns of sales taxes throughout the world
have undergone major changes. In the industrialized countries, by far the
most important type of sales tax today is the value added tax. This tax,
first introduced in France in 195^-55> is now the form used in all E.E.C.
countries, Sweden and Norway, Austria, in Braail at the state level, in
Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and in somewhat simplified
form in several of the ex-French West African countries. Except in Africa,
these taxes extend through the retail level, with exemption of small retailers
in most countries.
The shift to the value added tax away from the other forms reflects
several objectives:
1. In the original European Common Market countries., the desire to
escape the evils of the turnover tax with a levy that is compatible with the
Common Market and does not concentrate the impact of the tax on any one stage
in production and distribution. As other countries joined the Common Market,
David Davies, "The Si{piificance of the Taxation of Servicer for the
Pattern of Distribution of Tax Burden by Income Class," Proceedings of the
National Tax Association for 1969 * pp. 138-1U6; O.E. Kelson, "Progressivity of
of the Ontario Retail Sales Tax," Canadian Tax Journal , Vol 18 (Sept. -Oct. 1971),
pp. 1*11-1*15.
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they were committed, to the change under the requirements of the Common Market.
2. On the part of other European countries, to free export transactions
from all tax, under the belief that this objective is most easiljr realized
with this form of a tax.
3. In Latin America, to escape the turnover tax without concentrating
impact at one stage and yet collect much of the tax at retail levels; in
the case of the countries formerly using the manufacturers sales tax, to •
bring wholesale and retail margins within the scope of the tax without con-
centrating the tax at the retail level.
k. The belief that a value added tax is more easily enforced because
of the cross audit feature—tax reported as paid to the supplier by one
firm should appear as an element in the suppliers' tax payments to the
government.
Other major changes have included the establishment of several new
manufacturers sales taxes In Africa, in both British Commonwealth and fran-
cophone countries, but almost no additional use of them elsewhere (Guyana
is an exception). The tax continues in use in Columbia and the Philippines.
Retail sales tares have been introduced in several smaller Latin American
countries and Barbados, and are used in Iceland and in same states in India. No
new wholesale sales taxes were introduced. Sweden, Great Britain, and
Ireland shifted from this form as they joined the Common Market, and only
Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Portugal now use this tax.
The general experience is that any form of sales tax, other than the
•7
turnover or cascade tax,"" will work reasonably well under the appropriate
conditions. The manufacturers tax works satisfactorily under the simple
how confined to Spain, Mexico, and a few small countries.
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market structures of least developed countries. Retail sales taxes can "be
administered in countries with well developed commercial retailing, if,
in less developed countires, small firms are excluded and -^he rate is rela-
tively low. The value added tax functions well if properly designed.
The experience with the wholesale tax is relatively" limited, and no
recent studies of experience are available. Great Britain had substantial
difficulty with its purchase tax, with regard to uplift on direct sales to
retailers at low prices, delineation of commodities in various rate groups,
and anticipatory effects of rate changes—but these were attributable in
large measure to the high rates, the use of several different rates, and the
frequent rate changes. Australia and New Zealand appear to have had little
difficulty with the tax and do not use uplift on direct sales. Earlier
enquiries concluded that failure to provide uplift did not result in serious
complaints from smaller firms. The question of tax treatment of freight has
been the most controversial one in Australia.
Switzerland has provided a circuit-breaker type of relief for the
^•=ni firm—any retailer can register as a taxpayer, buy tax free and
*
pay tax on his saxes at a lower tax rate. This protects the smaller re-
tailer subject to competition from firms buying direct from manufacturers
at low taxable prices, provided the rate differential adequately reflects
2
the margins. Sweden abandoned the wholesale tax primarily because of the
J.F. Due, "Report of the Sales Tax Committee:. One Year in Retrospect,"
Canadian Tax Journal , Vol. 5 (March-April 1957), pp. 88-105; "The Whole-
sale Sales Tax in New Zealand ," Canadian Tax Journal , Vol. h (Sept. -Oct. 1956),
pp. 351-356; and Report of the Sales Tax Committee, 1956, op. cit.
2 ' „
J.F. Due, Sales Taxation and Diverse Distribution Channels—The Swiss
Solution," Canadian Tax Journal , Vol. 9 (March-April 196l), pp. 129-133-
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desire to exclude all producers goods from the tax.
On the whole, the experience of these countries, unfortunately not
studied in recent years, indicates that the taxes are acceptable elements in
the tax structures over long periods, but throw little light on the question of
whether such a levy would he more satisfactory in Canada than the present form
of sales tax. Kone of these countries face the problem of dual sales taxes
at national and provincial levels.
Lessened Federal Use
One final option is that of phasing out of the Federal sales tax,
leaving this sphere to the provinces,, as suggested by the Royal Commission.
In effect the Federal Government would take over still greater responsibili-
ty for income taxes and let the provinces rely more heavily on sales taxes
—the provinces presumably raising their rates as the Federal Government
lowered its rate. The idea is not without merit; the income tax is the most
effective tax from the standpoint of fiscal policy and the one most effective-
ly operated at the Federal level. It can be argued that the Federal Govern-
ment does not need to use a sales tax
—
just as the United States Federal
Government does not.
. This approach, however, is open to several types of criticism:
1. The provincial taxes are anything but ideal models of sales
taxation. For most effective operation and neutrality, they have far too
many exemptions of consumption goods, and they apply to an excessive range of
sales for business purposes. The provinces have never established a clearly
defined rationale of their sales tax structures.
Furthermore, no satisfactory approach to interprovincial transactions
has ever been worked out. Purchases from outside the province are typically
Lot reached ~by the tax; on the other hand, the provinces stubbornly refuse

?2
to grant credit for sales tax paid other provinces, thus creating the possi-
bility of double taxation.
2. The isr le of virtual sole Fede: al reliance on the income tax can
be argued both ways. Obviously the Federal Government could dispense with
the sales tax. But to do so could easily result in higher overall income
tax burdens—since the provinces might not reduce their own to an equivalent
degree—with possible adverse effects upon investment and economic development,
because of their fear of public reaction to high sales tax rates. This
change offers two primary merits by usual standards: the tax structure is
likely to be more progressive; and the less depressing effect on consumption
might facilitate attainment of a higher level of employment. On the other
hand, the higher income taxes could have a depressing effect upon investment
incentives and capital availability, more than offsetting the influence of
increased consumption demand. We do not know enough above the determinants
of real investment to be certain of the net effect. The income tax is a
better fiscal policy intrument, its yield rising with inflation, even with
the indexing feature, falling more rapidly than national income when business
activity falls. The sales tax yield is less responsive* thus greater reliance
on income taxes, despite indexing of the Federal income tax, should be to
provide greater stabilization effect—but this is a disadvantage to those who
regard Federal deficits as a serious menace. This is a very complex issue,
and this discussion, all that time permits, does not do it justice. But the
conclusions are by no means obvious.
Conclusion
Clearly the optimal solution for sales taxation in Canada is to move
the Federal sales tax to the retail level and merge the Federal and provincial
sales taxes into a single levy, excluding all producers goods, and applying

to all consumption expenditures except categories in which there is a very
strong case for exemption, with administration either by the Federal or
provincial governments. If the value added technique were used—and there is
no clear evidence that it is superior in the Canadian context to a retail
sales tax—administration would of necessity be Federal. Only the retail
tax can eliminate the difficulties inherent with the manufacturers or whole-
sale taxes.
But if the government rules this out—as it appears to do, at least
provisionally, because of the possible public reaction to a sales tax rata,
as high as 16% and the resistance of the provinces to adjustments in their
sales taxes to conform with a national standard and their fear of blame
for the high levy, any solution is second best; the problem is to select
among various evils. To move the Federal tax to the retail level and conceal
it would encounter serious opposition and is objectionable in principle. To
have a separate visible Federal retail tax would avoid the requirement of
coordination of provincial and Federal taxes but involve unnecessary dupli-
cation in compliance and administration and not escape the popular reactions
to the high rate—although otherwise attaining the advantages of the retail
level. To move to 'the wholesale level would offer only minor gains over the
present tax and is, in my estimation, not worth the trouble. Yet to remain
with the present tax is to perpetuate the inherent problems with this form of
tax. The provinces, by de facto preemption of zhe optimal form of sales
tax, have blocked the Federal Government for making the optimal change in its
sales tax. There is no easy way out.
There is still the possibility, however, that the government might re-
verse, the provisional position, convince the public that they would pay no
more sales tax under the revised system than they are at present, persuade

2U
the provinces to accept a uniform tax base with provincial collection (the
Federal Government would have to collect in Alberta and the territories),
and thus attain the optimal system. But I am not too hopeful.

Appendix I ot.
Major Sales Tax Systems
This table is designed to provide a general view of the use of various forms
of sales taxation. Often more than one rate is used; the rates given are not
necessarily current, as changes are frequent.
Country
Manufacturers Sales Tax
"
Canada, Federal
Columbia
Ghana
Kenya
Uganda
Tanzania
Malaysia
Pakistan
Brazil (federal)
South Africa
Year Int reduced
1923
1965
1965
1973
1968
TS6T
na
1951
na
1969
Greece
Turkey
Indonesia
Guyana
Philippines
Wholesale Sales Tax
'
Australia
New Zealand
Switzerland
Portugal
Retail Sales Tax
na
na
1950
1969
1936
1930
1933
1941
1966
Basic Rate, 1974
12
4
11.5
10
10
TX
5
20
8
10
various
10
various
7
15
20
4
7
Canada, provinces
United States, states
and localities
Iceland
Paraguay
1935-
1932-
1960
1969
5-8
3-6
7.5
3
Nicaragua
Honduras
Costa Rica
Barbados
Finland 5
1972
1964
1967
1975
na
5
4
5
10
12.4
Turnover Taxes"
Spain
Mexico
1964
na
1. Plus several ex-French countries of west and equatorial Africa.
2. Israel applies a wholesale tax to a number of commodities.
3. Plus Taiwan, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, South Korea, some Indian states.
4. Many of these taxes use more than one rate.
5. Retail and wholesale dual tax.
6. Some multiple application.
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e Added TaxescI-U
Country
Countries
France
Germany «
Netherlands
Luxembourg^
Belgium-*
Year
Introduced
1955
1968
1969
1970
1971
Italy
Ireland
United Kingdom
Denmark
:3ther European Countries
Sweden
Norway
Austria
Latin America
Chile
2
Brazil — state
Uruguay
Ecuador
Argentina
Bolivia
Partial:
1973
1972
1973
1967
1969
1970
1973
1975
1967
1968
1970
1975
1973
Rates, 1974
'
20; 7, 17. 6, 33.3
11; 5.5
16; 4
10; 2.5
18; 6, 14, 25
16; 6 )
"30*~
6.75; 11.11; 19.50; 36.75
8
15
Features
Through retail level since 1968
Through retail
17.65; 3.09, 9.89
20
16; 8
20
16.3 to 19
14; 5
4; 9
13; 21
5
TT
ft
n
M
II
II
II
If
If
fl
Peru5 1972 15; 3, 7, 10, 25 Through
wholesale only
Africa (levies known as value added taxes, but primarily limited to the
manufacturing sector)
Senegal
Malagasy Republic
Ivory Coast
Algeria
Morocco
Tunisia
1966 10; 4.25; 53
1969 13.6; 6.4
1960 10; 20; 23.9
na 25; 42.9
1961 14.6; 18.6; 25
1955 17.8
Primarily on manufacture-
Through wholesale
Optional beyond manufacturing
Primarily on manufacturers
Rates shown are effective rates, adjusted to a tax exclusive basis if imposed tax-included.
Basic rate given first.
2 The Federal tax has value added features but is confined to the
manufacturing sector.
3, The Benelux countries agreed in 1973 on a uniform basic rate of 16
percent, with a 4
percent reduced rate on necessities.
Plus other rates. . . n „«.«-
5. The credit for tax paid on purchases is severely limited in the
manufacturing sector,
Sources: S. Cnossen, "Sales and Excise Systems of the World", Finanzarchiv,
Vol. 33,
#2, 1975, pp. 177-236, and other sources.

Appendix II
Provincial Retail Sales Tax Rates
• as of May 1975
J ' '•
'
W „"J ^"Ft NS N.B. Que,"" Ont.» Man. Sask. Alta. B.C.
Basis :Retall Selling Price Nfld. F.E.I.
n^ 1^0. >*
1
_
_
—
~~
——
—
^ ^ j^ n jj 5<jk
Goods (tangible .personal property) ... . 8% 8% ?% ***> ^ ,^ ,^ ^ _ , 5^
Minimum taxable sale W M*
"J 3
~
%
--„
,Q% $% nll nll nil
Prepared meals . 8% » *
n $ , 00 $4on $3 .o0 _ _ -Minimum taxable meal nil $2-00 ?J.w *-•« * 1W l0*. S% nil 5%
Alcoholic beverages 87c "> /0
Taxable Services « g%„ s% s% 5% nil S<fcb
Hotel and motel accommodation .
.
8% 8% 7% 8% 8 »%
Telecommunications other than
g g%<
. s% J% m - nI, nll
telephone 87© nil
Telephone services . 5% s% i% nll Sft
Longdistance 8% nl * ^ ,%fc nll nll i%
Natural gas 8%* ni1
Electricity
n|1 g% nI1 5%h j%i nil 5%
SSS-^-.::::::::::::: : J 3 •»» - y ,; *
-
- -
Laundrv and Dry Cleaning 8% 8% nu ._ _____ —
retail sale, tax rate i. 5% for the period April B, MM to DoM-tarjKJW after «UA it^reverte teWj^J£« WSaSfSS
domestic dwelling units. ' Monthly rates on electric
for Electricity used lor heating Is provided-
Sources: Provincial statutes and regulations,
Reproduced from Canadian Tax Foundation, Provincial and Municipal
Finances, 1975, p. 65.



